Bazuka Android malware hides device takeover behind screenshots and adds AI victim management

Bazuka Android malware hides device takeover behind screenshots and adds AI victim management

ThreatFabric has uncovered Bazuka, an Android malware framework with 23 modules for stealing data and controlling infected devices. Its control panel also integrates large language models to help operators manage victims.

The malware can conceal its activity behind a screenshot of the victim’s home screen or lock screen. Users see a familiar screen while malicious operations continue underneath.

According to ThreatFabric, Bazuka can steal passwords, intercept verification codes, replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and provide remote device access. The Dutch mobile security company discovered it in late October 2026 while investigating an NFC-relay banking Trojan.

Fake TikTok app delivers the malware

One identified installer poses as a premium, adult-friendly TikTok app, using the package name com.tiktok.premium.

Researchers observed two installation paths. In one, the installer requests permission to install apps from third-party sources. It then downloads a separate APK, com.tiktok.premium.pro, which acts as a staging component.

The second path uses a downloader to fetch the main payload directly. Researchers suspect the staging component and downloader are the same. That component retrieves and launches the core and any modules needed for a campaign.

Bazuka’s panel lets operators create accounts for “traffers,” criminals who lure people into downloading malware. Possible lures include social media advertisements and fraudulent websites.

Operators can also build installers with different permissions declared in the Android manifest file. Researchers assess that this likely aims to evade Google Play’s app review process.

Those options suggest potential distribution through both traffers and Google Play. They do not establish that a Bazuka app reached the store.

Accessibility abuse enables hidden control

Once loaded, Bazuka records typed text and displays phishing overlays under instructions from its command-and-control server.

Its core coordinates the operation. It loads additional DEX modules, gathers device details, handles commands, and manages permissions and component updates.

Bazuka abuses Android accessibility services and Android Debug Bridge, or ADB, shell commands to obtain permissions automatically. The core can navigate system settings, enable Developer options, and turn on Wireless Debugging.

It then intercepts the pairing PIN and uses it to establish a TLS connection to the ADB daemon.

ThreatFabric said the malware also uses accessibility services to disable Google Play’s protection component. A separate self-destruct function clears local storage, deletes the database, and disables the app.

Two WebSocket channels separate its traffic. The Control channel carries commands, while the Data channel sends stolen information and captured screen streams.

The framework’s 23 modules divide its capabilities across theft, surveillance, device access, and evasion:

  • input_recorder records text in targeted apps and identifies card numbers, wallet addresses, and passwords. clip_monitor replaces copied cryptocurrency addresses with attacker-controlled addresses.
  • screen_control captures lock-screen PINs, passwords, and patterns through accessibility services. session_ui displays phishing HTML overlays.
  • smsmessage reads and sends SMS messages, extracts possible verification codes, and attempts message deletion. twofa captures one-time verification codes.
  • optics provides remote control, screen streaming, and phishing overlays. device_control manages devices through ADB and runs shell commands, while self_adb supplies an embedded ADB client.
  • contacts collects contact details, and file_manager accesses files. location uses GPS, cell towers, and Wi-Fi to locate victims.
  • media takes photos and streams camera video and microphone audio. tapread-nfc_module interacts with contactless bank cards.
  • call_forwarding controls forwarding through USSD commands. ussd sends requests and receives mobile operator responses.
  • proxy creates a reverse TCP proxy. push manages local Android notifications, while toast displays on-screen text.
  • oem_power opens settings for power saving, background operation, and automatic startup. uninstall_shield resists attempts to uninstall or force-stop the app.
  • preflight checks the runtime environment. system_checker also examines that environment and applies anti-analysis measures.

AI tools help operators select victims

Bazuka’s control panel supports locally hosted language models and models reached through an API. Operators can use them to identify victims of interest and manage infections.

A sample prompt supplied by the malware’s author refers to a score. This suggests operators may be able to ask models to rank victims by their appeal as targets.

ThreatFabric has not linked Bazuka to a known threat actor or group. Its panel contains interface elements in both English and Russian.

In its technical report, ThreatFabric warned that ADB bridging is becoming common among banking Trojans. Such access can enable covert privileges and independent modules that survive removal of the host app.

The researchers stressed that Bazuka’s current architecture has not reached that level of persistence.

ArcticRAT also uses language models

Separate research from Zimperium zLabs describes another Android threat combining remote control with AI-assisted analysis of stolen data.

ArcticRAT supports 129 commands and uses LLM APIs to extract financial intelligence from stolen SMS messages and app data. Researchers Rajat Goyal and Fernando Ortega said it began as spyware targeting users of 11 cryptocurrency apps.

Its installers impersonate Amazon, TikTok, cryptocurrency apps, and generic file managers. Malicious advertisements, SMS phishing, and third-party forums direct users to counterfeit Google Play listings.

After installation, ArcticRAT abuses accessibility services for remote control and fraud automation. It communicates with its command infrastructure through TCP sockets.

An initial device profile guides the server’s choice of payloads. The malware can stream live video, steal credentials and private communications, and capture authentication codes.

Its overlays can steal lock-screen patterns, PINs, and passwords. Other overlays attempt to extort cryptocurrency payments.

Hard-coded prompts ask language models to act as professional SMS and device-app analyzers. They process stolen messages and identify financial, banking, and trading apps.

Zimperium said ArcticRAT requests VPN privileges to null-route device traffic during staging, blocking Google Play Protect telemetry.

It also hides attacker activity behind a black overlay that users cannot dismiss, while reducing brightness to zero. This makes the device appear locked or powered off during banking-app access or automatic permission approvals.

Recent versions also abuse Wireless Debugging to start privileged shell sessions. Those sessions can change accessibility permissions, verify lock-screen credentials, and display a black screen to conceal background activity.

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